2 State formation and the economy of intra-state wars

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War-making and state-making: still a valid interrelation?

Contemporary civil wars have apparently lost any rationality, if not any political meaning. The cruelties committed in the course of war, the lack of political programs, and the endless proliferation of actors seem to hint at a growth of anomic violence. Some observers therefore argue that the development of warfare after the end of the Cold War displays only the irrationality of actors. Robert Kaplan's article on "the coming anarchy" in 1994 was as widely read and discussed in the US as that of his German counterpart, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, with its similar dark messages: "Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg," in 1995. Both authors maintain a depoliticization of violence, an irrationality that renders it questionable whether a scientific explanation of current occurrences of wars is still possible.

Quite according to expectations, social scientists contradicted this view, for good and convincing reasons (cf. Kalyvas 2000). Despite the "atomization of goals" and the "radicalization of means" (Marchal 2000) that can be observed, contemporary wars have their underlying causes and complex interactions in the social and political spaces in which they take place. Therefore, this chapter starts with the assumption that actors of contemporary wars interact at least partly rationally. Its central question is whether the results of these interactions can be interpreted as an expression of a hidden logic, or, to put it in Norbert Elias's terms, as "unintended interlacements" (1977: 131): Is there a logic of state formation discernable in contemporary wars?

That there used to be a relationship between warfare and state-building in European history has become one of the most broadly acknowledged findings of the historically oriented social sciences. At least since Charles Tilly (1985) coined the phrase of "wars make states, and states make war," this insight has become general wisdom.1 According to this view, the emergence and the institutional shape of European states are largely the result of their violent history. The core argument runs as follows: power-holders needed armed forces and material resources in order to foster their
position against internal and external violent contenders. The installation of standing armies and of rigid extractive systems of taxation was thus mutually reinforcing preconditions for the maintenance of power positions. These efforts to erect the systems of extraction and of military capacities were at the basis of the emergence of the strong state in European history.²

There is a lot to be said about this subject. But this chapter will not contain any exhaustive discussion of its single elements or of historical knowledge related to the thesis. Its main question is rather directed towards its current validity: Is this relation between warfare and state-building still valid when it comes to contemporary wars and states?

In the following attempt to assemble some elements to answer this question, three points – two restrictions and one enlargement – seem to be necessary:

1 The considerations of this chapter will not deal with all aspects that actually needed to be taken into account. I will, for example, not deal with the effects of mere threats of warfare. Furthermore, there is no answer to the questions of whether the structure of the international system during the Cold War, the spread of the norm of mutual recognition of states, or the balance of powers have to a large extent prevented the – in other historical times – very common phenomenon of annexation of states.

2 As contemporary wars are mostly intra-state wars,³ the considerations will only deal with those countries in which long enduring civil wars have been taking place in the last decade or so.⁴

3 The enlargement concerns the understanding of the term “economic.” Contrary to the common usage, I employ the term for all kinds of activities and structures that concern the provision of goods and services, not just those covered by official macroeconomic statistics.

Some words about the term “state” might be appropriate though. Presupposing the vailness of looking for a generally accepted definition of the state, I will refer to an understanding of the state that takes it as a field of power shaped first by a general image of what a state ought to be and second by practices that are related to this image (Migdal and Schlichte 2002). In the image of the state that has been globalized in the course of what has become known as the “European expansion,” the state is seen as a political organization, sovereign in its relation to other agencies concerning the administration of violence and the economic order and the establishment and enforcement of rules. This covers more or less the general self-understanding of state actors and the ideal of international organizations. However, most states are not what they would like to be. There is almost always a considerable gap between aspirations of state actors and actual forms. Any empirical investigation dealing with the state has to consider this remarkable difference.
Empirically, states differ enormously. Local traditions, the time and modes of integration into the modern world system, the specific blend of different political realms, such as in the experience of colonization – all this contributes to variations in the concrete forms in which single cases of state formation historically evolve. These variations can be observed in different practices, in the various ways states actually work. Thus, states differ from each other in more than one regard, in their inner working mechanisms, in their relation to other social and political agencies, and in the boundaries that delineate them – and this not only in a territorial sense.

With this distinction between the image of a state as a concomitant reference and the practices, the ways a state actually works, it shall be possible to assess and to describe the dynamics of contemporary state formation in a more appropriate way than this is possible with most current conceptions of state theories. These theories, which are themselves marked by the image of the state, attribute it with a functional core, namely an apparatus of coercion and control with a capacity of extraction and an ability to set and enforce rules. It is this functional core, however, that will serve as the structural background for this investigation. In three sections I try to assemble from the literature on contemporary wars some generalizations about the effects of “war economies” on states as they work. In this way, I try to assess how far contemporary wars lead to a greater convergence or dissociation between the image and the practices of states.

As will be shown, there are hardly any universal historical theses about the relationship between state-building and the inner economic order of intra-state wars. Apart from the specific structure of “an economy” in general, the relationship is determined by the pathways of integration in world markets and its “world historical timing.” Thus, structures and opportunities decide about the possibilities and limits of war economies and their effects on those efforts to rebuild a state after a war. In contemporary contexts, I will argue, these possibilities are rather restricted. The economy of current intra-state wars creates structures that contradict the “traditional” logic of state-building in the Western experience. But this is, however, not the entire story: as can be seen regarding the extraction competence of the state, the control of the territory and regarding “state mentalities,” there are also tendencies in the opposite direction. As a result of these contradicting tendencies, political forms that emerge from civil wars do not meet what is meant by the classical understanding of states.

**Flows and registers: the state’s competence of extraction**

Contrary to the general impression, protracted warfare does not change everything in a society, nor in its political forms. As will be shown in this section, the kind of insertion in the global economy, for example, structures the “internal” economy before, during and also after the war. From an economic point of view, the pervasive informalization of the economy
marks the main problem that intra-state wars cause for the post-war consolidation of states. Once established, state actors have huge problems to bring a war economy under control again, partly because rulers themselves rely on informal power resources. In this situation, the economy of international aid plays an important role as an “emergency exit” in the efforts of restoring political domination.

In intra-state wars, as has often been argued, state structures decay. Several reasons are behind this general tendency:

1 Under the conditions of warfare, state capacities focus on the organization and the fueling of the military machine, and the civilian functions of the state are neglected respectively.

2 In most intra-state wars the economy slows down as regular economic activities suffer under the conditions of insecurity. In particular flight, expulsion and the migration of substantial parts of the population lead to a decrease in economic activities.

3 Informal ways of economic production and distribution grow in importance. War times are times of shadow economy, times of informalization with the respective consequences for the state’s cashbox.

Even in those states which had a rather high level of state organization in pre-war times, the informalization of the economy tends to be enormous. The bloody dismantling of former Yugoslavia is a good case in point. Hyperinflation, the loss of regular employment, and the rigidity of state regulations led or favored informal activities so that the population of the remainder of Yugoslavia in 1994 gained 50 percent of its income in the shadow economy (Reuter 1994: 491). These changes in the relation between the economy and the state do of course have their consequences for the forms of rule. Parallel structures of political authority develop and the holders of public offices also begin to rely on informal power sources. They “dub” the state and its official institutions by constructing a second network of power relations. In order to capture the meaning of these developments, William Reno (1995), for instance, has coined the term of “the shadow state”; Bayart et al. (1997) have been talking about the “criminalization” of the state.²

Yet when a war has ended and when some kind of internationally recognized political authority has been re-established, the question of the state’s fiscal basis re-emerges – usually with a need to “officialize” fiscality. The emerging solutions show how much war economies alter state structures and in which regard. At this point, two economic facts come to the fore:

1 Even if wars last for many years or decades, many old economic structures have not ceased to exist. Wars change the face of an economy but they do not alter all of its structures. This applies particularly to the basic conditions of its insertion into the world economy. Export goods
are most likely still the same, and the economic position of a country within the international division of labor usually does not shift profoundly.

2 Intra-state wars cause a high degree of informalization of both the economy and politics. This is a very problematic heritage for the re-establishment of statehood and severely hampers the legalization of new economic structures.

However, these problems of war economies concern not only the "normal" population but also the war-winners. On a "top-level" it might be relatively simple to go back to normal. In many cases, warlords create economic patterns that are not much different from pre-war structures. During the war in Liberia, for example, concessions for the export of timber and iron-ore were the most important sources of income for Charles Taylor's "National Patriotic Front of Liberia" (NPFL) (cf. Ellis 1999: 164–180). This rent and concession economy had already been the basis of the pre-war state. Through the international recognition of electoral results, which changed Taylor from a warlord into a head of state, the private, criminal economy of a warring faction was merely transformed into a state business. This resembled the form of state business that had formerly been in practice in Liberia from the beginning of the twentieth century.

In the thousands of instances of less visible economic relations that develop during a war, the transformation is much harder to achieve. Economic opportunities have been appropriated by violent means and they might be defended by violence too. Attempts to "re-formalize" the economy – i.e. to bring it back under state control – might fuel tendencies to relaunch warfare. The transformation is also difficult as many of these relations spread across international boundaries. Thus, without territorial control extraction cannot be enforced, but without considerable extraction, territorial control cannot be achieved and maintained. Some examples prove this genuine circularity of the competencies of extraction and violence. The spread of the Liberian civil war into Sierra Leone and other neighboring states was typical in this regard. But also the intervention of Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces in the war in Congo (Zaire) can be seen as a continuation of such a trajectory: the appropriation of power resources by violent means. In these cases, the line between intra- and inter-state warfare becomes fluid, like any other boundary that delineates the state. Cambodia's post-war economy is just another example that shows how the re-establishment of state control of exports could not be achieved. The Khmer Rouge as well as Cambodian army officers were selling timber to foreign companies without paying any tribute to the central state (Möller 1998: 263). As a result of this circularity of extraction and territorial control, various forms of balances between informal arrangements and formal institutionalizations emerge. The basic problem
for the transformation of a war economy, and therefore for sustainable peace-building, is to deal with economic opportunities that have been appropriated during the war. War economies create many losers, but also some winners. Should the rewards of peace not seem profitable, the winners are prone to use their means in order to continue war.

The post-war situation is further complicated through the "framing" of state actors by international agencies. The stalemate of extraction that results from informalization is the leverage for the introduction of those constellations that are euphemistically labeled "global governance," namely the interlacements of different agencies that circumvent, control and mix with the state on different levels. International "aid" for the reconstruction of war-torn societies comes in as the entire industry of "development" recommences after a war and delivers considerable flows of means. Yet this internationally steered rebuilding of states turns out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, this internationalization offers to some extent exits from warfare, as it allows a state budget to be run without putting too much pressure on the economy that could create resistance. On the other hand, the recourse to "aid" also sets essential constraints on the reconfiguration of state domination. Now rulers have to take external imperatives into account, and, of course, this internationalization of rule has its historical roots too, illustrated by the case of external debts. International political recognition means also the recognition of former obligations. Loans that have been taken on international markets need to be reimbursed, as well as obligations toward the international financial organizations.

Finally, the longer a war has lasted, the stronger is the "acclimatization" to the absence of the state. This raises psychological barriers and fosters coalitions of interest that hinder the reintroduction of state-imposed taxes, tolls and duties. It is also for this reason that post-war states slide deeper into international dependencies. The flows of aid allow the delicate affair of enlarging the tax base to be circumvented. The agencies and agents of aid induce a fiscal structure that can avoid immediate internal conflict. Those structures, obligations and alliances that were created before and during the war add to this. As a result, fiscal structures after an intra-state war are heavily shaped by international dependencies. In Mozambique, for example, grants and loans amounted to 75 percent of the post-war state's budget in 1994. As Michael Pugh (Chapter 3 in this book) shows, the post-war situations in Kosovo and Bosnia are no different in this regard. These cases display the same effect: once international dependencies are created they are difficult to overcome. In Uganda, where international donors attested huge successes in rebuilding state structures after the major war ended in 1986, 30 percent of the 1998 budget still consisted of external "grants and loans" (MFEP 1998). The extraction competence of the Ugandan state towards its "national" economy is mainly restricted to the taxation of international trade. Duties on petrol and vehicles and taxes on
local products constitute the bulk of recurrent revenue. The much higher flows of labor remittances and incomes from the informal sector, however, escape the state's grip. Post-war states tend to have fiscal structures that are only loosely connected with their societies. It is anybody's guess whether the flow of international aid will be a first step to enabling a state to introduce a more “classical” fiscality or whether aid will develop into a stable system with its own logic and inner dynamic, rather preventing the reconstruction of the classical fiscal structures of extraction.

Capacities of control: the state and its competitors

States grow slowly. However clear and outspoken the image of a state might be, however pompous its rituals and scenic productions may appear, the actual practices in which a state really works do not need to correspond to this image. Practices change slowly, and their growth towards the globalized role-model image of the state is not inevitable. There are alternatives, even for the administration of violence. In this regard, intra-state wars are also seasons for the mushrooming of new forms for the deliverance of “public goods,” and the efforts of state actors to integrate these forms into the framework of state control usually lead to ambiguous results.

In an intra-state war the administration of violence is no longer controlled by the state. Instead, the main organizations in charge of the domestic control of violence – police forces and the judiciary – are prone to dissolution. To them a general truth applies: intra-state wars have devastating effects on institutions because under the “preponderance of short-term thinking,” investments in institutions do not pay (Genschel and Schlichte 1998). However, new forms of institution-building also take place during a war. There are developments that run counter to the general tendency of dissolution and decay. Therefore new forms for the control of violence also develop. There are numerous examples in the control of territories that make this clear.

In regions that are not directly affected by warfare, for instance, in many cases the state as an institution is nevertheless absent or unable to fulfill its functions. Yet the general problem of the control of the means of physical force needs to be solved. Typically, this is the hour of militias that pursue the aim of self-defense or develop their own policies in a war. The events in Somalia (cf. Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995) or Sierra Leone (cf. Abdullah and Muana 1998) are telling examples. The re-emergence of “traditional” forms of control of violence is another reaction to the decay of state institutions. In the years of anarchy that ruled in Uganda after Idi Amin came to power in the early 1970s, a system of “popular justice” developed. Culprits or suspects were judged and punished by local groups that gathered ad hoc and acted without written or formal rules. This “system” is of course extremely susceptible to arbitrary decisions and instrumentalizations for the private ends of local strongmen.
Another interesting example is the role of enclaves of modern capitalist production, or rather extraction, in war-torn societies. In these, private security corporations provide the necessary security environment for a profitable economic extraction. In this way, for instance, private companies have protected petrol sites in Algeria and Angola, or diamond mines in Sierra Leone while civil wars were in full swing. This, too, is nothing but the privatization of the means of physical force standing in a strange relationship with the essential tenet of the modern state.

These forms – militias as agents of self-defense, various institutions of "grassroots-justice," and the commercial privatization of security – need to be integrated in a state’s system of violence control once a war is over and regular relations of public administration must be rebuilt. For a time, they might be seen as a “décharge” of the state (cf. Hibou 1999: 33–41), in the sense that the state outsources some of its tasks in order to alleviate the burden by granting more room to maneuver to intermediaries. But this, of course, enhances the danger that these intermediaries accumulate more and more power, and may later turn the relationship upside down. The state will be fragmented then, territorially or functionally.

A similar point can be made concerning the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations. In recent years, programs and measures of humanitarian aid, especially in the context of intra-state wars, have become one of the fastest growing sectors of official developmental aid – and of foreign policy in general. The relevance of humanitarian aid for the dynamics of, in, and after wars can hardly be overestimated. Meanwhile it is very well known and documented that despite good intentions, foreign aid may sustain wars instead of alleviating their effects. The flow of resources through the sanctuaries of refugee camps or the demand for security of NGO personnel in war zones turn into economic opportunities for all kinds of protection rackets that fuel the war economy and thus sustain structures of violence beside the state-controlled monopoly of physical force. Equally important but largely overlooked are other long-term effects on the state’s capacities of control. “Humanitarian corridors,” for example, might turn into entry points for alliances that hinder the re-establishment of regular political authority. The interests of NGOs and those of war actors become intertwined very quickly. The result of these interlacements can grow into power alliances that make the political center more dependent on local power holders than it ever used to be.

In the course of intra-state wars, new political constellations arise in which the moral economy of the humanitarian unfolds. This has important consequences for the possibilities of state rule. Large parts of those fields which, according to a classical understanding, belong to the domain of the state, are transferred into para-statal authority. Water supply, rural development, health and public education are some of those areas in which NGOs and international donors develop re-distributive functions, often in
explicit competition with the state, which is thus no longer in a position to get the merits for delivering public goods. These developments normally originate in the situation of war, they grow stronger the longer the war endures, and they often petrify in the period of successful peace settlements.

Causes and effects of aid intervention can no longer be separated then: the lack of institutionalization and efficiency that is so characteristic of post-war states is the reason for the engagement of foreign actors, but their activities deprive the state of those gains in organization and legitimacy that it would achieve by developing its own capacities to deliver public goods. If this constellation applies equally to the function of security, as is the case when military intervention forces take over police functions as in Bosnia or Kosovo, the state eventually turns into a mirage. There is still an image of a state then, but practices of everyday life show a highly divergent picture. The division of labor between agencies of control that typically emerge in contemporary post-war situations is in striking contrast to the image of a world of unitary states that colorful maps let us think are real. Contrary to this image of a well-organized political landscape, rule and control have been increasingly internationalized, broken and assimilated with local power structures. There is no one political space dominated by the state, but an overlapping of different spaces of control, each of which is filled with commands, obedience and resistance.

Representations and rules: about the emergence of state mentalities

According to well-known classical state conceptions, loyal armed forces and functioning tax authorities form indispensable parts of any state. But a state needs more than that. A state must be able to introduce rules and to enforce them. As the broad literature on the subject of legitimacy suggests, this function of rule-setting and rule-enforcement presupposes that the state is anchored in the minds and thoughts of social actors. This does not imply that all the state’s rules are obeyed and observed. There will always remain tension between legal regulations and private morals. However, the state needs to be accepted “as a part of the landscape” (Migdal 1997: 5) so that its requests are at least considered on the basis of being righteous or justified. This is what is meant by the term “state mentality,” of which different kinds and degrees exist. They range from a very loose and skeptical attitude towards the state up to the kind of “state priests,” as Karl Marx denounced jurists and lawyers (1968: 60). In any case, these mentalities cannot be reduced to mere output-oriented, instrumental attitudes by which organizational theories explain loyalty towards the state.

In intra-state wars, it is said, these kinds of state mentalities die out. Different experiences of violence split the population into different factions that pay tribute to other agencies, but not to an abstract state. The
defeated develop a strong *resentment* against the new order, whereas the victorious consider the result of a war as their personal merit, so for them there is no need to share the gains for the sake of joint "statehood." It is the exception that the new state is seen as a solution by everybody. Intra-state wars destroy state allegiances because their costs are always enormous. There is not only impoverishment caused by inflation and military spending, but also the loss of relatives, and the hardship that with war enters all spheres of life might lead to a decrease in legitimacy that can grow into a "system crisis."

Given all that, states nevertheless do not simply vanish after civil wars. Despite the general impression of a decreasing importance of states, there have never been as many states as nowadays and there have never been so few voices calling for the abolition of statehood. Neither corporate interests nor liberation movements want to live without a state. The former just want to restrict it, the latter just want their own. The project of the "statization of the world" (Reinhart 1999) was apparently successful: the idea of the state as a political form is mentally well anchored all over the world. And it is this image of the state that is nurtured by the rituals and actions of international politics as the form of interaction between states. States have seats and votes in international organizations, they mutually acknowledge each other, and they can even visit each other. The mist of the community of states has become so strong that it is almost beyond imagination that a state could vanish. Annexations do not occur, the order of international boundaries is not discussed. Partition is the only way for states to vanish. The end of the Soviet Union and the decay of Yugoslavia are cases in point, not to mention the independence of Eritrea or the de facto secession of Somaliland.

International recognition could be one reason why states survive even long civil wars during which their entire infrastructure is dissolved. Liberia, Uganda, Lebanon – none of these states disappeared as an image, and, strangely, the image seemed strong enough to serve as a point of departure for the political reconstruction of these societies. Even in those states that are not much more than a mirage, the state as an image is present on coins and in national football teams, in passports and on license plates. Apparently, some decades of existence have been enough to anchor the state as an image so deeply that after a war there is little debate of rebuilding state-like authority. At least on the international level the persisting image of the state induces a certain kind of ascription of meaning even in the cases of the most hollow buildings of authority. In this regard, the fiefdom of the warlord Charles Taylor was the opposite of what Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1987) described as the hollowness of the juridical statehood of African states.

Thus, it could seem as if in postwar settings state mentalities of international actors are pitted against non-state loyalties among the population. Accordingly, in international politics, the political task of rebuilding war-torn
societies and states is conceived in this manner. A lot of peace-building efforts and programs of democratization aim at the introduction and support of those understandings of political rule that have this classical image of the state as its main reference. The international reputation of these states depends on the evaluation of their efforts in terms of “democratization” and the observance of human rights. Their international sovereignty is symbolized in their seats and votes in international organizations. Seen from outside, states appear as territorial organizations. Internationally, it is the “image” of the state that counts.

But in actual practices, things might look quite different. States may not be able to control the entire territory, their bureaucracies might be mere facades that do not play any role in the everyday life of the population. In most societies that were or are still affected by civil wars, the relative convergence of state images and practices has not yet been accomplished. Their sovereignty as an integral part of the image of a state might be faked. There are even examples of client states that were more or less made up by other powers in order to give the impression of independent statehood.\(^\text{11}\) In all of these cases, the actual power of a state resides in quite different spheres than in the relation between the state and its “own” population. Political power is generated and fostered in political spaces that are not “national” ones.

Christopher Clapham has recently stated that the history of Ethiopia and Eritrea, so rich in warfare, has not led to a strengthening in state institutions simply because the costs of modern warfare have been so high that a peasant society could not bear these costs (Clapham 2000: 7). Not even the ideological effect one might have expected by the countless involvements in armed struggle has appeared, as the case indicates, when there are deeply separating lines within a society. Collective experiences, entrenched in the collective memory, can be much stronger than the effects of events that build an alleged “national fate.”

Clapham hints at one interesting exception though, namely the “Eritrean People’s Liberation Front” (EPLF). In its history of more than thirty years of armed struggle against the ambitions of different regimes in Addis Ababa, this movement has proved to be “one of the strongest insurgent movements of the modern era, not just in Africa but in the world” (2000: 9). It developed its strength, Clapham argues, because its neutral ideology could bridge the gap between inner oppositions and because a far-reaching network of exiled members generated considerable means in order to finance the war. Through this dense network and the intensive cultural life Eritreans developed in their “host” societies throughout the world, “Eritrea” had more than a virtual existence even before it became independent. This same “cement” then was the reason for the strong authoritarian centralism of the post-independence Eritrean state.

This case hints at a tendency that concerns the state as well as its challengers: the dislocation of political spaces. Other warring parties in other
cases also live to a large extent on the support of exiled groups, for instance the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the different political organizations of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{12} The “image” of a rebellious movement that is fighting and reproducing itself on a given territory is in contradiction to the practices of an organization that not only has modern logistics but is also accumulating support on different stages. The public sphere of Western media and the contributions of exiled groups are equally as important for its strength as the support of the local population in the actual war zones. The political space in which warring factions act is by no means restricted to a state’s territory.\textsuperscript{13}

These findings lead to reflections on the linkage between state mentalities and material flows. Is the flow of resources a necessary condition for the emergence of allegiances? Was Max Weber right in stating that, apart from the type of legitimacy, any state must “meet the material interests at least of its staff” (Weber 1985: 122)? In the light of the foregoing theses about the strange constellations between political authority and economy that are typical for postwar societies, there would be little reason to believe that allegiances to “a state” will develop.

The strength of the image of states, it could be summarized, rests largely on the orientation of international politics towards it. Actors in international politics need an addressee, they expect it to be a state and they imagine it according to the image of states. By contrast, local actors might think and act differently. They might have allegiances that are much stronger than their belief in the rights and the justification of a state. In some cases this kind of state mentality can develop in the course of a war, and there are cases where the respective state is not even “real” but more or less imagined by exiled groups. In other cases, the experiences of war rather deepen the frictions and fissures that run through a society and hinder the emergence of a state mentality as a prerequisite of legitimate rule. State mentalities are anything but a necessary result of intra-state wars.

**Conclusions: forms of war and forms of states**

The effects of contemporary wars on statehood are ambivalent. There is no single, unambiguous causal relation between states and wars. States are not simple war machines and warfare does not automatically lead to a strengthening or weakening of the state. Instead, the contradictions of war seemingly apply also to the state. In this sense, politics are just the continuation of war (Foucault 1999: 29). So it depends on concrete contexts whether the events and changes that occur during and after a war foster or weaken a form of political domination in which authority comes close to the “image” of the state.

In a plea for adapting the concepts of security studies to the reality of politics outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) world, for example, Keith Krause added further arguments as to why the process of the socialization of the state is not taking place ubiquitously. In the Middle East, he argues, the path dependency of authoritarian militarism and of international rent-seeking strategies allows the perpetuation of the separation between states and "their" societies. The relative independence of the rentier state from domestic actors leads to a situation in which the monopolization of the means of physical force has been achieved without simultaneously entailing the statization of minds (cf. Krause 1996). In the light of Krause's findings, some further general remarks concerning global historical timing can be made, however. They concern a point mentioned before, i.e. global historical timing. The analysis of the economy of contemporary wars and the focus on the proper dynamic of enduring violence should not deceive us about the conditions under which they take place. They are globally embedded, and this global embeddedness accounts for a variety of more general conditions of war economies and for the possible dynamics of states.

In European history, opportunities for state-building also depended on the possibilities of economic and social differentiation and chances of social mobility. In more than one sense, the history of state formation was also the history of capitalism. The state was of course itself an important vector of social mobility, but its formation was based on the emergence of social forces that counterbalanced the weight and the power of the state. And the emergence of these social forces was in turn a result of disruptive "modernization." The historical lesson is clear: it was only due to the pressure of powerful social forces that warfare led to pushes in democratization and enlargements of state functions. Warring Western states needed the support of all relevant social groups and therefore adapted distributive policies of inclusion and integration (cf. Eley 1995). There can be no civic-capitalist state without a bourgeoisie. It is, however, questionable whether current global processes of differentiation and modernization will simply repeat the Western experience, i.e. whether it will come to analogous processes of embourgeoisement in other world regions. Current structures of the global economy might impede it, and other pathways into a capitalist modernity might lead to different political forms than classical statehood.

Most warring states in the early twenty-first century are integrated into the world economy on a very narrow basis. The bigger flows of resources are channeled through the state. Therefore in almost all of the cases the state has been the decisive site for the distribution of material benefits. That is why the incumbency of state offices is very often at the core of the conflict. The appropriation of all kinds of opportunities, offices, grants, aid and "projects" becomes the most important avenue for the accumulation of political power and economic wealth. In weakly institutionalized states such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa or South East Asia, the power balance on which the public order rests is one between patronage networks. This is also true in most contemporary war societies before and after the outbreak
of violence. The basic disadvantage of these systems is, however, that they are not able to come to terms with the social dynamics that take place on their territory. Sooner or later, social imbalances emerge that cannot be solved with the restricted set of political instruments in these systems. Physical force then is one universal resource to achieve change when situations become unbearable.

The tensions that arise in these situations can easily escalate. In this regard, the stories of Lebanon, Uganda or Sierra Leone are quite similar. Paul Richards (1996) has sketched the following constellation of the latter case: marginalized young men for which a crumbling system of patronage could no longer offer any prospects have tried all kinds of ways to improve their personal situations. At some point, violent contest is one means, among others, in order to escape despair. The rebellion of these youngsters is “a blind jump in a dreamt modernity” (Marchal 2000: 174). Imagined rewards of this kind play a role in Algeria (cf. Martinez 1998), as they did in the motivation of those recruited for the Lebanese militias (cf. Beyhum 1999: 133). Social dynamics of this kind fuel wars and war economies, and this problematique is a major obstacle for any postwar settlement.

The political constellations that came into being in Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia or Kosovo seem to indicate what forms of political domination result from contemporary wars: a patchwork of appropriated competencies and vested interests, a mixture of local, international and “state” authorities that can hardly be called a coherent form of authority. One might wonder whether this kind of controlled anarchy will eventually lead to something that comes closer to what used to be called the state, particularly as the vested interests of foreign actors tend to prolong their activities eternally, and the behavior of local agents does not display visible tendencies towards state-like institutionalizations.

In the light of this comparison, it seems to be evident that the underlying social dynamics of contemporary violent conflicts are not the same as in the European past. The relation between political organization and mass violence is different. As has been alluded to in this chapter, actors in contemporary wars try to alleviate or improve their situations with strategies that were not at hand in other global times – or at least not in this combination. Clandestine or officially registered migration, the mutual help networks of diasporas, the variety of informal economy, the role of international aid organizations, and, last but not least, various forms of violent contest are part of these strategies and practices. Their emergence and development have, by the way, consequences for political forms that do not necessarily develop together with the occurrence of major armed conflicts (cf. Schlichte and Wilke 2000). In comparison to the profoundness of social and political change, war is still a “secondary phenomenon” (Porter 1994: 3).

It is not the classical territorial state, in control of its “national” economy and a community of citizens clinging to “constitutional patriotism,” but
the constant movement of fluid commitments and allegiances that form the structures of the global political space. The resulting forms will probably not be covered by the language of current state theory. Forms become more complex than the repertoire of conceptions political science has to offer. But this is not a new insight: the lemurs of science only emerge after dusk.

Notes

1 Max Weber as well as Otto Hintze and Norbert Elias had delivered main elements of this insight much earlier, and Tilly, of course, does not ignore their contributions. See e.g. Hintze (1906).

2 This is the vulgar version of the relationship. Charles Tilly (1992) differentiated it in an elaborated analysis, distinguishing different pathways of state building which can be traced back to differences in the accumulation and concentration of “coercion” and “capital.”

3 For an overview of contemporary war development cf. the annual reports of the study group on causes of war at the University of Hamburg: http://www.akuf.de

4 The material on which these reflections are based is thus not representative for the entire reality of contemporary wars. The theses presented here are really hypothetical. The main basis for the following are Ellis (1999), Marchal and Messiant (1997), Schlichte (1996) and the contributions in Jean and Rufin (1996). In order to keep the text readable, not all references are made explicit.

5 The term “criminalization” is however problematic here, as it is actually the state that defines what is criminal. This hints at the general semantic problem in the study of the state: it is difficult to talk about it without using its language.

6 This informalization, however, can also take place without warlike events. Perhaps the most telling example is the case of labor remittances in Yemen that amounted to three times the GDP in the 1970s (Chaudry 1997: 244).

7 Former Liberian governments were charged with selling forced labor at the League of Nations in the 1920s or with selling huge plots of land to foreign companies, as in the case of the Firestone rubber plantation. On these war economies without wars cf. Young (1934) and Kraaij (1983).

8 Regarding this point, see Chapter 8 by Joakim Gundel on Somalia in this book.

9 Of which the emotions of the Western public are a constitutive part like the small crowd of moral engineers and intellectuals that together with eager politicians form the moral agenda of “urgent affairs” (cf. Pouligny 2000).

10 The only – disputable – exception in the times after the Second World War is the German Democratic Republic.

11 There is a multitude of policies in international relations that have led some authors to the conclusion that the idea and the talk of “sovereignty” is just hypocrisy (cf. Krasner 1999).

12 For the PKK see Paul White (2000); the history of Palestinian resistance is documented in Sayigh (1997).

13 The war between “liberation movements” and “states” is thus also a symbolic one. Besides the material economy of the war, there is a symbolic economy, closely related to the former. Successes in acquiring the better international reputation can easily lead to decisive material and strategic advantages.
14 But embourgeoisement is conflictive as such, as the global past has shown. This is because modernization means dislocation. The dissolution of traditional forms of social integration is part of it, like the decay of old patterns of reproduction and the individualization of property and income. The issue of land tenure in contemporary Africa is telling concerning the conflictivity of these processes. The history of Latin America is telling concerning the longevity of these conflictual constellations. And European history is telling as it shows that conflicts of modernization can only be contained in peaceful channels when a mode of distribution is installed that can satisfy most aspirations and organized interests.

References


